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Abstract
This paper examines how China’s systemic impact on the world economy and 
growing presence in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) affects processes of structural 
change in SSA countries. It is argued that these effects depend both on their size 
and composition which varies across different SSA countries, as well as their 
mediation through domestic policy. This paper explores potential China-related 
effects on industrialisation processes in SSA as well as the role of (industrial) 
policy in mediating these effects. In particular, it is argued that capitalising on 
the full potential of domestic markets by strengthening intersectoral and final 
consumer demand becomes increasingly important in light of the more limited 
scope for export-led manufacturing sector growth stemming from China’s sys-
temic impact on the world economy. The paper further proposes a framework to 
separate empirically the differences in manufacturing sector growth that can be 
explained by differences in the size and composition of various China-related 
effects from those resulting from differences in country-specific factors. 
Keywords: Industrialization; China-Africa, Industrial policy
1. Introduction
Given the unique growth dynamics inherent to the manufacturing sector in 
terms of productivity- and output growth, structural change is considered a 
necessary if not sufficient condition for catching-up with advanced economies 
in terms of material standards of living (Szirmai, 2012). Sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries lag behind other regions in this respect, the vast majority them 
being among the least industrialised countries in the world. On aggregate, there 
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has been little if any improvement over the last decade: in 2011, the manufac-
turing sector accounted for 8.6% of total value added in SSA countries’ GDP1, 
down from 9.4% in 2000. However, while the majority of SSA countries has 
experienced either a negligible rise or even a fall in manufacturing output, some 
SSA countries experienced relatively strong increases over the last decade with 
real manufacturing output per capita more than doubling in Angola, Equatorial 
Guinea, Liberia, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Gabon (comparing 2011 levels to 
a 1996-2000 average; calculations based on United Nations National Accounts 
Database).
Against this background, a much polarized debate on how China affects 
industrialisation in Sub-Saharan Africa has ensued. On the one hand, China is 
seen as blocking the stepladder to industrial development by outcompeting Afri-
can manufactured goods (Kaplinsky, 2008). On the other hand, China is seen as 
a ‘golden opportunity’ for industrialisation in SSA as its own industrial upgrad-
ing frees up jobs in labour-intensive manufacturing, which – combined with an 
increasing number of Chinese investments and infrastructure projects in SSA 
– could ignite local industrialisation (Lin, 2012).
This paper aims to contribute to this debate not by providing a conclusive 
empirical answer on whether one or the other interpretation is correct. Instead, 
it asks: what is the role of policy in shaping China-related effects on manufac-
turing sector growth in SSA? Global trends such as China’s rise in the world 
economy may act as important constraints or accelerators to industrial devel-
opment – however, different potential China effects will affect individual coun-
tries differently and, on top of that, domestic policy plays an important role in 
shaping these effects. 
However, this statement as such remains unsatisfactory because what consti-
tutes appropriate policy is itself dependent on our understanding of the work-
ings of the economy and society. Against the free-market orthodoxy pushed 
by the Washington institutions stand the policy lessons derived from the East 
Asian developmental states. Therefore, the paper takes a step back and grounds 
China-related effects on industrialisation in a wider theoretical framework of 
late-industrialisation. Crucially, this reveals that our understanding of the key 
issues of industrialisation – and hence our assessment of the potential impact of 
China and the role of policy - needs to be extended beyond questions of produc-
tivity growth and export promotion to include domestic market formation and 
domestic class-relations. 
1 For the purposes on this paper Sub-Saharan Africa excludes South Africa due to its very different de-
gree of economic development and Somalia due to a lack of reliable data. 
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The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 investigates the interplay between 
global and domestic factors influencing late-industrialisation, section 3 discuss- 
es how China changes the external context of industrialisation and identifies the 
most relevant “China effects” as well as the ensuing policy challenges. Section 
4 provides a starting point for further comparative empirical analysis of policy 
responses, using cluster analysis to separate the differences in manufacturing 
sector growth that can be explained by differences in the size and composition 
of various China-related effects from those resulting from differences in do- 
mestic policy mediation. It finds differences in average manufacturing output 
growth across groups of countries with similar China-effects, but also within 
them. 
2. Late-industrialisation – The developmental state and beyond
In order to determine how China shapes the global economic context for late-in-
dustrialisation in SSA and what can be considered critical policy challenges 
within this new setting, this first section will review which lessons regarding 
the role of the state and the global have been derived from successful late-in-
dustrialisers in East Asia. It is argued that those lessons remain highly relevant, 
especially when contrasted to the orthodoxy proposing a minimalist or at best 
piecemeal role for the state. However, while the literature on the East Asian 
developmental states established the growth and gradual upgrading of manufac-
turing exports as key successful late-industrialisation, it is argued that we need 
to extend our understanding of late-industrialisation to include the mechanisms 
supporting domestic market formation. In addition, the feasibility of industrial 
policy does not necessarily rest on good-governance but needs to be asserted 
within the wider social relations in individual SSA countries. 
2.1. Supply-side constraints to industrial development – technological learning 
and economies of scale
What constitutes an appropriate role for the state in economic development re-
mains a highly contentious topic. Letting the free market forces work, poten-
tially correcting specific market failures in a piecemeal way if warranted by 
state-capacity prevails since the Washington- and later post-Washington Con-
sensus. By contrast the critical accounts of successful late-industrialisers in East 
Asia show that these relied on highly interventionist states. A full review of this 
literature is beyond the scope of this article; the focus here lies on tracing its 
conceptual foundations. 
Drawing on evolutionary growth theory, the seminal studies of Amsden (1989) 
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and Wade (1990) on South Korea and Taiwan, linked late industrialisation to 
technological learning and the conditions under which successful technology 
acquisition occurs. They maintain that in order to catch-up with advanced econ-
omies, developing economies need to master new technologies and close the 
gap in technological evolution. While late developers can, at least in theory, 
skip whole stages of technological development (and thus technological fail-
ure), successful assimilation of foreign technologies depends on more than just 
accessing relevant ‘blueprints’. In particular, on top of economy wide factors, 
such as the quality of education and infrastructure,2 firm-level productivity also 
depends on workers’ tacit knowledge of how to operate machines effectively 
and tacit organisational capabilities of a firm (e.g. how to set up teams to ensure 
a smooth production). These tacit components of firm level productivity are the 
result of a process of learning-by-doing (Khan, 2013).
Importantly, this implies that production has to begin before firms have 
achieved competitiveness and hence some form of loss-financing is required 
as, by definition, competitiveness cannot be achieved for a considerable length 
of time (Khan, 2013). Therefore, all seminal accounts of East Asian late-indus-
trialisation significantly depart from the free-market orthodoxy to stress that 
a significant level of state guidance in the form of measures such as subsidies 
on inputs, government investment to promote technical or economic linkages 
among industries, incentives to export or tariff protection were necessary to 
support technology acquisition and productivity increases (see for instance H-J 
Chang 2002; Wade 1990; Amsden 1989).
How to best design such measures depends on various domestic factors such 
as firm-size or ownership structures but also on global factors such as on the 
nature of global frontier technology. Furthermore, new constraints to technolo-
gy transfer can arise over time, such as the current regulations on international 
property rights or the differentiation of production in global value chains. In 
practice, therefore, technology transfer requires substantial negotiation skills 
on the part of policy makers in developing countries to negotiate technology 
transfer with multinational corporations (H-J Chang, 1998). 
While the literature on the ‘East-Asian miracles’ conceives late-industriali-
sation primarily as a problem of ‘learning how to compete’ (see Amsden 1989 
or Amsden 1990), insights from classical development theory complement this 
understanding of the supply-side dynamics underlying industrial output growth 
2 Or more broadly the national innovation system, i.e. the network of public and private institutions that 
build human resources, stimulate technological activity, finance technological investment and provide 
technological infrastructure.
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in that they highlight that productivity increases are not merely a function of 
knowledge but also of scale. 
In particular, the possibility of realising firm level economies of scale, which 
are the basis of productivity increases, is itself a function of the size of the mar-
ket. Firm level economies of scale, arising for instance through division of la-
bour and specialisation can translate into increasing returns to scale at industry/ 
economy level through pecuniary externalities, i.e. externalities linked to mon-
etary and price effects.3 For example, more efficient production in one sector 
results in a reduction of output prices of that sector. Consequently, the expand-
ing sector not only creates demand for its own inputs, but, through its cheaper 
outputs also reduces the input costs of other sectors. As a result, other sectors 
can also expand their output and realise further economies of scale. Their ex-
pansion, in turn, creates positive pecuniary externalities for others and so on 
triggering a positive feedback loop (cumulative causation) where productivity 
growth causes output growth and output growth causes productivity growth. 
This central theme of Adam Smith is picked up by authors like Young (1928) 
or Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). Crucially, their theories of cumulative causation 
rely on the assumption of Say’s law, i.e. everything that is produced will also be 
consumed.4 
2.2.The demand-side implications of increasing returns to scale and their 
systemic effects 
The observation that manufacturing sector growth is dependent upon (and not 
only leading to) aggregate output growth, has far reaching implications once 
the assumption of Say’s law is relaxed. Essentially, mass-production requires 
mass-consumption, which can become a binding constraint. The answer to the 
question how and under what conditions dynamically expanding levels of out-
put can be absorbed by a corresponding rise in demand has a significant bearing 
on policy making, notably with respect to what kind of industries should be 
promoted, the role of labour compensation and inter-sectoral linkage formation. 
Canonically, expanding and gradually upgrading exports is seen as a solution 
to potential demand-constraints to manufacturing output growth, with exports 
being both a critical component of aggregate demand and a constraint to late-in-
dustrialisers’ capacity to import capital goods.5 Indeed, setting export targets 
3 See Scitovsky (1954) for a definition of technological and pecuniary externalities.
4 Even though Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) demonstrates that various coordination failures can impede the 
circle of cumulative causation to unfold. 
5 Thirlwall’s growth model illustrates why the volume and gradual upgrading of a country’s exports is 
positively correlated to its (industrial) growth potential. The intuition is simple: export earnings have 
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was singled out as the quintessential feature that explains the East Asian success 
with industrial policy when compared to the experiences of Latin American 
and Sub-Saharan African countries (see for instance Amsden 2001; Shafaeddin 
2012). 
Against this stands the observation that there are global limits to such an 
expansion of export markets. First, there is a problem of simultaneity (‘fallacy 
of composition’) – while export-led manufacturing can work for one country 
it cannot become a strategy for all countries simultaneously because there are 
limits to the total expenditure of developed countries on manufactured goods 
(Onaran, 2011). Second, systemic effects manifest when developing countries 
engage in intense competition over highly substitutable manufacturing products 
through price competition and wage depression (Razmi and Blecker, 2008). The 
fallacy of this race to the bottom is that the concurrent attempt of each country 
to boost its competitiveness at the expense of domestic purchasing power causes 
an overall deflation in world demand capacity. At the same time it produces sys-
temic price effects thereby transposing the problem of declining terms of trade 
and the balance of payments problems stemming from it to a different group of 
products, i.e. low value added manufactures (Bloch and Sapsford, 2000).
Amsden (1990) accepts the demand-side limits to exports of low-value added 
manufactures but maintains that this does not pose a problem as long as supply 
capacity is developed in higher value-added sectors and the export structure 
gradually upgraded. But again, while this can prove a convincing strategy for 
one country, it cannot become one for all countries because this flying-geese-
type process must necessarily happen at unequal speed (and therefore system-
atically exclude some countries) for it otherwise reproduces the systemic price 
effects we currently observe for low-value added manufactures at an even high-
er level – unless there is a continuous rise in aggregate demand in the world 
economy as a whole.
More generally, this raises the question what determines expansion in de-
mand (be it export or domestic) in the first place. Thirlwall introduces a demand 
constraint on (industrial) output growth, but this only stems from exogenous in-
come growth. Nothing accounts endogenously for changes in the saving/invest-
ment behaviour of capitalists. Post-Keynesian theories on income distribution 
to finance (capital goods) imports. However, generally income and price elasticities for exports from 
developing countries are lower than developing countries’ income and price elasticities for (capital) 
imports. Therefore, the demand for (foreign capital) imports outpaces its export earnings. As no coun-
try can permanently run a deficit, (manufacturing sector) growth is balance of payments constrained 
(Thirlwall, 2013).
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and growth provide an additional, albeit not binding, explanatory element. The 
intuition is simple: when the demand base is very narrow manufactured goods 
are only sold to the relatively few rich. Given their small numbers they cannot 
sustain demand for mass-production. Hence, in an economy, in which invest-
ment is determined by an anticipation of demand rather the availability of sav-
ings, a very unequal distribution of income between wages and profits can lead 
to a short-fall of demand for industrial output which, in turn, limits investment 
and decelerates manufacturing output growth (Dutt, 1984).
On a more practical level, the limitations to global demand capacity bring to 
the fore the role of domestic demand growth in sustaining late-industrialisation. 
One way to break away from the under-consumption and balance of payments 
constraints is by adapting and adopting imported technology for domestic mar-
ket production (Lo, 2011). If demand growth depends on income distribution, 
then appropriate labour compensation and redistributive measures become an 
integral part of domestic market formation. The French regulation school does, 
indeed, argue that wage growth in line with productivity growth was one of 
the pillars that sustained the so-called ‘Golden Age’ in post-War Europe (Li-
pietz, 1982). In addition, output of other sectors of the economy (in particular 
agriculture and construction) will determine demand for manufacturing sector 
output, thereby limiting or accelerating manufacturing output growth. Bhaduri 
(2006) traces the complexities of managing intersectoral demand and productiv-
ity growth at the example of India and the Soviet Union. 
This does not invalidate the importance of exports, which, as set out earlier, 
are crucial as they have to finance imports of capital goods. It does highlight, 
however, that (a) the type of exports matters (and this can change over time as 
a function of the global demand context) and that (b) industrial output growth 
is equally dependent on an expansion of domestic aggregate demand (which is 
both a function of income distribution and productivity increases in other sec-
tors). 
2.3. From developmental states to processes of accumulation: what is the state? 
If policy has a role to play in sustaining industrial development, e.g. by pro-
viding support for technology acquisition or overcoming domestic under-con-
sumption and balance of payments constraints, how we think about the state has 
a significant bearing on the type and extent of state-interventions necessary to 
foster structural change. 
Although state and market are increasingly seen as potential complements, 
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the state-market dualism often remains the starting point for discussion. The 
concept of market failures provides the basis of analysis making the legitimacy 
of state-intervention dependent upon the state’s capacity to improve on market 
outcomes. In essence, this requires a normative assessment to determine when 
this balance becomes positive and the costs of government intervention are 
worthwhile given the chance at success in correcting market failures (Latsch, 
2008). Consequently, even where it is accepted as a potentially useful inter-
vention the benefit of the doubt is given to the market questioning the practical 
feasibility of industrial policy – especially in SSA:
“Hence, the empirical relevance of these ideas remains to be demonstrated. 
In the absence of such a demonstration, government intervention to promote 
industrial diversification must be judged a risky strategy.” (Rodrik, 1996) 
Instead, industrial policy should be used with care favouring a “pragmatic 
and limited approach to interventions as a means of stimulating industrialization 
(…).” (Weiss, 2011) 
Political science contributions have identified the characteristics of states, 
in which interventionist policies were successful emphasising in particular the 
need for “embedded autonomy” – i.e. a bureaucracy aloof from vested interests 
yet not self-serving but instead constrained by the society they represent. This 
also establishes ‘good governance’ as a prerequisite to successful industrial pol-
icy. For analytical purposes, the conceptualisation of the state which sees the 
state as the source of power-relations rather than the outcome thereof is prob-
lematic as it conceals how specific vested economic, political and ideological 
interests come about, what sustains them (materially and ideologically) and how 
they change over time (Fine, 2013). 
The embedded autonomy framework remains too general in this respect. 
Khan (various years) argues that while good governance (such as transparency, 
the stable rule of law or low levels of corruption) is desirable in itself, the fo-
cus on such conditions diverts attention from other more important institutional 
arrangements needed for successful industrial policy. For subsidy schemes to 
work, the threat of removing the subsidy has to be credible as otherwise firms 
do not have the necessary incentives to put in the necessary amount of effort to 
actually become competitive and instead just cash-in the subsidy without any 
occurrence of learning by doing. In that sense, industrial policy is not so much 
about picking winners – and having the right information to do so – but about 
eliminating losers. The feasibility of this depends on the nature of patron-cli-
ent networks not their absence. In other words, the success of industrial policy 
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hinges upon the fit between the institutional design and the type of political 
settlement (Khan, 2013).
At the same time, the embedded autonomy framework remains too narrow 
in the sense that it reduces the role of the state to state-business relations alone. 
However, structural transformation is also a process of social transformation. 
Understanding which (distributional) conflicts emerge during this process of 
rapid social change and how these are resolved through the state and through 
the market is indispensable to determine what is and what should be the role of 
the state (D. Chang, 2013). 
3. Situating China specific effects and the role of (industrial) policy
The previous section showed that industrial development unfolds in a complex 
interaction between systemic factors rooted in the world economy (such as the 
dominant type of technologies or price and demand structures) and factors that 
are specific to individual economies (such as its absorptive capacity, its demand 
capacity and intersectoral linkages), which, in turn, are a function of policy and 
power-relations. The following sections will explore how and through which 
channels China’s systemic impact on world markets and its growing interaction 
with Sub-Saharan African economies affects the prospects for industrialisation 
processes in SSA and what sorts of policy challenges this raises for SSA coun-
tries. Disentangling this nexus requires an understanding of how China helps 
or hinders SSA countries’ technology acquisition but also how it affects their 
balance of payments and domestic demand constraints as well as how it inter-
acts with the wider social relations and the political economy of SSA countries. 
Having concluded that late-industrialisation depends as much on building the 
domestic-demand side of the economy as it depends on supporting technology 
acquisition and export-capacity, the following section argues that this conclu-
sion becomes all the more relevant in view of the systemic changes in global de-
mand- and price structures ensuing from China’s systemic impact on the world 
economy.
3.1. Reduced scope for export-led industrialisation
China exerts two contradictory effects on SSA countries’ external demand con-
straint by, on the one hand, increasingly demanding raw materials and, on the 
other hand, by competing with local producers in the manufacturing sector. 
For some countries the acceleration of Chinese demand for raw materials 
constitutes a substantial increase in export demand and thus has a positive 
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effect on their balance of payment position. Bagnai, Rieber, & Tran (2012), for 
instance, find that, on average, the balance of payment consistent growth rate of 
SSA countries has increased from 2.2% in the period 1990-99 to 5.4% in the pe-
riod 2000-08. About a third of this relaxation was due to the expansion of export 
markets in “developing Asia” (mainly China; Bagnai et al., 2012).
Any positive effect on the balance of payments position can be (more than) 
off-set if Chinese manufactures out-compete African manufactures on world 
and domestic markets (‘displacement-effect). China supplies 13% of total world 
exports, 34% of exports in textiles and clothing and 50% of world exports in 
footwear (calculations based on UN COMTRADE). This has implications for 
industrialisation of SSA countries because it blocks the stepladder to export-led 
industrialisation (Kaplinsky, 2008). Giovannetti & Sanfilippo (2009) for in-
stance find that a 1% increase in Chinese exports is associated to a reduction 
of -0.07% in African exports on world markets of the same products. However, 
this displacement effect varies across sectors and is decreasing over time (see 
Geda & Meskel, 2010 and Villoria, 2009). African apparel producers survive in 
niche markets, often supported by Chinese investments itself (Tang, 2014) and 
Ethiopia even significantly increased its exports of apparel and footwear. Yet 
even for Ethiopia, export earnings generated from footwear ($ 27.4 million in 
2014) remain tiny relative to total Ethiopian exports ($ 2.5 billion in 2014) and 
total world trade in footwear ($ 125 billion in 2014, of which $ 63 billion are 
Chinese exports; calculations based on UN COMTRADE).
These changes in demand structures are further amplified through price ef-
fects. For example, Kaplinsky & Farooki (2012) show that China’s demand for 
raw materials has spurred world market prices for hard and energy commodi-
ties. At the same time, Chinese manufacturing also put downward pressure on 
world market prices for manufactures. As a result, SSA countries producing 
hard and energy commodities benefit – at least temporarily – from an improve-
ment in their terms of trade. Figure 1, illustrates this broad trend: from the early 
2000s onwards, on aggregate, terms of trade of SSA countries have improved. 
Thus, the seemingly contradictory displacement and balance of payments 
effects are, in fact, two sides of the same coin, each reflecting the systemic 
impact of China’s own economic transformation: while China’s own demand 
structures coupled to the systemic price effects that ensue from there positively 
impact on the balance of payments position of individual countries, the nature of 
Chinese supply on world markets reinforces problems associated to the ‘fallacy 
of composition’.
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Figure 1: terms oF trade index suB-saharan aFrica and china 1990-2013 
(2000=100)
How these effects work out in practice will depend both on the type of dominant 
effect and on policy mediation. The improvements in terms of trade and the 
acceleration of export demand make it easier for some resource-rich countries 
to finance capital goods imports. Thus even though Chinese demand is highly 
skewed towards mineral and energy commodities, this does not necessarily en-
tail anti-developmental effects provided that the increased export-revenues are 
channelled into imports for the productive sectors (e.g. through tax breaks and 
tariff structures), in particular capital goods for manufacturing. If this is not the 
case, however, Chinese demand patterns can lock-in SSA countries in unfa-
vourable production structures. The question therefore is what sorts of policies 
and societal forces can assure the former outcome. Similarly, where countries 
suffer from intense Chinese competition on home and world markets, policy 
can mitigate these adverse effects (see for instance the example of the Ethiopian 
footwear industry Gebre-Egziabher 2009; Brautigam 2009).
At a more general level, the changes in the world economic order analysed 
above also call for a reflection on shifting policy priorities in particular with 
regards to export-led manufacturing sector growth and flying geese patterns, 
established by the literature on the East Asian developmental states as key to 
late-industrialisation. Importantly, the lessons from East Asia should not be gen-
eralised beyond their context specificity, which was marked by rapidly expand-
ing markets for consumer goods in OECD countries in the 1960s and increased 
access to international finance in the context of the Cold War (Wade, 1990). The 
global economic context that enabled export-led industrialisation has changed 
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significantly, in particular in terms of relative prices and demand structures, 
which can partly be linked to China’s systemic impact on the world economy. 
Some scholars maintain that as China upgrades its own industries, “nearly 
100 million labour intensive jobs in manufacturing [will free up]” (Lin, 2012), 
some of these could move to Africa. It is still only speculative as to when these 
relocations might occur and if so whether any of them would go to SSA (see for 
instance Ozawa & Bellak, 2011). Tang (2014) finds that, with the exception of 
the China JD group in Tanzania, Chinese investments in apparel production in 
Africa remain, so far, small to medium in scale. The developmental effect would 
also depend on the nature of these potential relocations, which will be limited 
should they follow purely a logic of saving labour costs. Productivity increases 
are not fast enough to reach knowledge and research intensive activities if pro-
duction focuses solely on profit realisation through cheap labour. Furthermore, 
incomes generated by this type of industrial activity are too low to sustain local 
industrialisation and trigger production for the home market (lipietz, 1982).
Either way, for the time being SSA countries are more restricted by limits in 
the expansion of export demand for low-value added manufactures than it has 
been the case for East Asian Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs).6 Even for 
resource rich SSA countries whose capacity to import capital goods is (tempo-
rarily) decoupled from expanding manufacturing exports, the tendency for the 
prices of low-value added manufactures to fall reinforces the problems associat-
ed with the ‘fallacy of composition’ and makes an industrialisation path through 
a gradual upgrading of low-value added manufactures more difficult to real-
ise. Therefore, harnessing the demand potential embodied in domestic markets 
(whether intersectoral or final consumer demand) will be even more relevant to 
build the backbone of a dynamically expanding manufacturing sector. Resource 
rich countries are also well-placed to do so because of their improving balance 
of payments position.
3.2 Increased opportunities for domestic market formation 
If the above conclusion is correct and domestic market formation can be con-
sidered a core challenge for late-industrialisers today, then it is important to 
note that the nature of Chinese engagement with SSA countries has itself the 
potential to promote such domestic market formation if supported by appropri-
ate policies.
6 The focus on export performance in explaining East-Asian industrialisation successes even understates 
the role that growth of domestic markets played in the East Asian NICs. Chenery & Syrquin (1975) for 
instance show that about half of industrial output growth in South Korea could be attributed to domestic 
demand expansion.
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Supporting domestic market formation: Intersectoral demand growth and tech-
nology transfer through the operations of Chinese firms?
The first question is whether or not the rising volumes of Chinese Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in SSA countries are conducive to technology transfer and skill 
formation, which are, as established above, key drivers of late-industrialisation. 
While, overall, Chinese FDI in SSA countries remains small when compared 
to FDI from OECD countries, in 2013, 31% of private-led Chinese investment 
projects in SSA countries have been undertaken in the manufacturing sector 
(Shen, 2015). Even in countries with comparatively low levels of Chinese FDI 
such as Rwanda (see Figure 2), these investments do generate spill-over effects 
at the micro-level in terms of employment generation and skill formation with 
Chinese firms, contrary to popular belief, engaging in training of local labour 
for reasons of cost efficiency (Shen, 2015).7 In the telecommunications sec-
tor, the Rwandan government has also negotiated technological upgrading and 
transfer of expertise with ZTE and Huawei, as part of the broader government 
strategy to enhance the country’s ICT sector (Gu and Carty, 2014). Brautigam 
(2008) also gives an example Chinese trading networks having spurred a small 
boom in the production of spare auto parts in the Nigerian town of Nnewi. All 
of these examples illustrate the potential for learning and technology spillover 
through the operations of Chinese firms – even if only at the micro-level.
The answer to the question how to maximise learning and technology spill-
overs will need to be given on a case-by-case basis but the research findings 
on the East Asian developmental states provide a useful starting point, notably 
with respect to business models (i.e. firm size and ownership-structures), ac-
cessing technology (e.g. licenses or FDI) and human capital formation within 
the national system of innovation (i.e. formal education, subsidies for on the job 
training and more broadly the interaction between public research institutions, 
academic and applied research) (Lall, 2004).
Yet, policy challenges go beyond technology transfer and skill formation. 
Qualitative firm-level evidence suggests that more than half of private sector led 
Chinese FDI is attracted by the large domestic markets of African countries. In 
many cases, the investments follow a rise in import-tariffs on consumer goods 
making relocation a more profitable way to penetrate the local market than ex-
porting (Shen, 2015). This evidence actually suggests not a ‘flying geese’-type 
7 Other research findings indicate that the tendency of Chinese firms to import inputs and labour from 
China reflects more a lack of comprehensive investment policies as well as remaining skill-mismatches 
than a reluctance of Chinese firms to source locally (Gu, 2011). Corkin (2011) finds that while Chinese 
firms operating in Angola engage in local labour training and set up local manufacturing subsidiaries to 
produce supplies for construction locally the longer they stay in the market, supply chain formation is 
primarily constrained by the quality and quantity of supplies in the host country.
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pattern, driven by consecutive relocations of labour-intensive export-oriented 
industries to save labour costs, but one that is driven by domestic market forma-
tion. This, in turn, has important policy implications: if investments are attracted 
by an anticipation of growing consumer demand, then the policy challenge actu-
ally becomes to support lower-end domestic purchasing power through income 
redistribution and by ensuring appropriate labour compensation. 
Figure 2. chinese Fdi as % oF gross Fixed caPitaL Formation three Year average 
(2011-2013)
In addition, Chinese firms operating in light manufacturing processing indus-
tries such as textiles, tannery and wood processing have also indicated being 
attracted by the availability of agricultural raw materials (Shen, 2015). Poli- 
cy challenges therefore extend to supporting agricultural output growth and 
strengthening supply chain formation. In Ethiopia for instance, supply chain 
formation between Chinese tannery firms and Chinese shoe manufacturers 
remains limited because leather suppliers would lose their tax benefits if products 
were sold domestically instead of being exported (Brautigam & Tang, 2014).
Indeed, accelerating linkage formation to other productive sectors of the 
economy is, as set out previously, an important aspect of late-industrialisation. 
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The commodities price boom and related reorganisation of production are rel-
evant in this regard. In particular, the trend towards outsourcing of non-core 
activities in mineral and energy commodity value chains - such as the provi-
sion of non-core inputs such as food accommodation, logistics and security, 
opens possibilities for resource-based linkage formation. Once identified, policy 
can broaden and deepen this process by addressing context-specific hindrances 
(Kaplinsky, 2013). However, it is important to note that the operations of Chi-
nese firms offer a significant potential for linkage formation over and beyond 
the mining sector. 
Beyond FDI, Chinese firms also engage in a particular form of co-operation 
called “Chinese overseas contracted projects” (COP), i.e. construction projects 
carried out by Chinese firms in third countries financed through Chinese conces-
sional and non-concessional finance (provided for instance by institutions like 
the China Development Bank or the Export-Import Bank of China (ExIm Bank) 
but also through bidding on projects financed by international organisations and 
local governments (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009). Not all of these have a 
concessional element and qualify as ODA (Brautigam, 2011), but they do in-
volve activities of Chinese firms in the beneficiary countries. 
In terms of magnitude, COPs are far more important than Chinese firms op-
erating through FDI (see Figure 3), with USD 3.1 billion in FDI flows standing 
against a face-value of USD 40.6 billion of COPs in 2013. 
Figure 3. chinese overseas contracted ProJects vs. chinese Fdi to ssa ($miLLion)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various years) and 2013 Statistical Bulletin on Chinese  Outward FDI
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Macro-level effects on manufacturing sector development related to Chinese 
firms are therefore more likely to come through COPs than FDI. Other than ad-
dressing the well-documented infrastructure gap in SSA (see for instance Foster, 
Butterfield, Chen, & Pushak 2009), thereby contributing to providing the ena-
bling environment for industrial development, COPs create a market for build-
ing materials. For instance, investment data, provided by the Angolan National 
Investment Authority (ANIP) for the years 2011 and 2012, reveal that the largest 
share of manufacturing sector investments in Angola are in the production of 
intermediate inputs, a category which includes in particular building materials 
such as cement/ lime/ plaster as well as iron and steel products (see Table 1).8 
Given the importance of COPs relative to Angolan GDP (see Figure 4), this 
suggests that Chinese construction related activities can contribute to linkage 
formation to manufacturing sector (see also Corkin, 2011).
taBLe 1. manuFacturing sector investments 2011 and 2012 BY Broad categorY 










Food + Beverages 34,201 157,442 3,230 259 2,573 2,814 200,520
Intermediate Inputs 612,318 897 5,889 551 2,913 9,369 631,937
Machinery 29,481 2,225 173 5,766 0 0 37,644
Final consumption 3,963 144 288 3,270 17,551 0 25,217
Medical equipment 0 2,452 0 0 0 0 2,452
Recycling 0 0 0 0 2,305 2,205 4,509
Total 679,963 163,160 9,580 9,846 25,342 14,387 902,279
Source: Agência Nacional para o Investimento Privado
Taken together, these trends from agriculture, mining and construction suggest 
that other than the question of how to facilitate firm level technology and skill 
transfer through Chinese manufacturing firms, policy and research attention also 
has to focus on factors that constrain supply chain formation to the construction, 
agricultural and mining sectors. 
8 Based on author’s calculations from data provided by ANIP (Agência Nacional para o Investimento 
Privado). All data have been deflated to 2005 constant USD using the Angolan GDP deflator for the year of 
investment. The author counts as tax havens all countries defined as tax havens by (Hines and Rice, 1994). 
The broad categories have been aggregated from 4 digit data (ISIC rev. 4) as follows: 1511 to 1600 = 
“Food and Beverages”, 1711 to 1920 + 2211 to 2230 + 3210 to + 3410 to 3699 + 3330 + 2893 + 2930 
= “Final Consumption Goods”, 2010 to 2109 + 2310 to 2899 + 3130+ 3420 + 3430 + 3210 + 1533 
= “Intermediate Inputs”, 2911 to 3190 + 3313 + 3320 + 2813 = “Machinery”, 3311 to 3330 + 2423 
= “Medical Equipment”
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Below the radar innovation: alternative sources of demand
Kaplinsky (2013) explores the hypothesis that Chinese firms can induce ‘below 
the radar innovations’. Chinese products are not necessarily designed for North-
ern markets but target distinctly new types of consumers based in low income 
countries. These so-called ‘bottom of the billion’ products (as exemplified by 
Chinese motorcycles or the Indian Tata Nano), induce innovation. The changing 
patterns of innovation and dominant technologies away from large-scale and 
capital-intensive technology prevailing in high income countries, calls, in turn, 
for a rethinking of policy priorities within national innovation systems. While 
the specificity of Chinese capital goods and the resulting firm level hindrances 
in their adoption are still under research, the transfer of bottom of the billion 
products is already observable in SSA countries. For instance, news media ar-
ticles report that – supported by the China-Africa Fund – four Chinese car pro-
ducers invested a total of USD 400 million into the production of cars and motor 
vehicles for the Sub-Saharan African market.9
The process of poor-poor innovation can be further promoted by directing 
low-cost capital, such as micro-credit, to small-scale entrepreneurs and inves-
tors in pro-poor technologies. In addition, the national innovation system has to 
lay the foundations not only for the adoption of global frontier technologies but 
also identify providers of bottom of the billion products and provide them with 
targeted support. In other words, the changes in the nature of consumer products 
and the technology used to produce them require a rethinking of appropriate 
policies in support of technology acquisition (Kaplinsky, 2013).
China’s impact on the domestic demand constraint: Employment on Chinese 
contracted projects broadening the demand base?
Below the radar technology is, by definition, small-scale in nature limiting the 
possibilities of realising (dynamic) increasing returns to scale and productivity 
increases, which are crucial to sustain the self-reinforcing process of industrial 
development. The production of early labour intensive consumer products, such 
as processed food, beverages or furniture for domestic markets can be com-
plementary in this respect. As set out above, mass-production for the domestic 
market can be constrained by the lack of wide-spread demand base. Therefore, 
beyond promoting supply capacity in these sectors, there is a role for labour 
market and re-distributive policies at the service of industrial development in 
order to improve household’s available income and to set consumption incen-
tives for domestic manufactures. 
9  http://finance.people.com.cn/bank/n/2012/1212/c202331-19877629.html
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The mode of Chinese engagement with SSA countries through COPs can 
further support this kind of demand generation. In some countries, COPs make 
up for a large part of GDP – e.g. up to 12% in Liberia (see Figure 4), making 
them a potentially important source of employment/ income generation, which 
broadens the demand base. 
Figure 4. chinese overseas contracted ProJects as % oF gdP, avr. 2011-2013
Importantly, COPs do have local labour content: survey data from 32 Chinese 
companies in the construction sector reveal that 51% of the labour content is 
sourced locally (Corkin, 2011), while Tang (2010) estimates the share of An-
golan labour in Chinese companies at 60% on average with variations across 
sectors.
Overall, this suggests that, over and beyond their potential positive effect 
on the supply side, COPs could play a role in generating employment in SSA 
countries, thereby contributing to domestic market formation and creating the 
potential for positive demand feedback loops. But again, government policy has 
a role to play, e.g. by facilitating appropriate vocational training and skill forma-
tion alongside appropriate labour market and redistributive policies. 
4. Comparing policy responses
What stands out empirically is that manufacturing sector growth has been high-
ly unequal across different SSA countries over the past decade. Measuring the 
percent increase of the manufacturing value added per capita over the past 
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decade (2011 relative to a baseline given by the 1996-2000 average output), we 
find 15 SSA countries that experienced a decrease in their manufacturing output 
per capita, 19 countries recorded increases of less than 70% and 11 countries 
observed an increase of more than 70%, of which six experienced increases of 
more than 120% (Figure 5).10 The question becomes whether those countries 
that experienced a decline in manufacturing output are also those experienc-
ing predominantly negative China-effects and vice versa. The answer to this 
question is not straightforward because, as established above, how different 
China-effects work out in practice will also depend on policy mediation.
Figure 5. manuFacturing vaLue added Per caPita, % increase 2011 
reLative to 1996 – 2000 average
10 To make these growth rates comparable, figure 5 groups SSA countries according to their degree of 
industrialisation relative to world quintiles.
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Therefore, establishing whether any differences in manufacturing output growth 
observable across SSA countries can be linked to China, requires to separate 
effects linked to differences in the size and composition of the various China-ef-
fects from effects linked to differences in policy mediation and those effects that 
can be explained by differences in other factors that shape the global economy 
(see Figure 6).
Figure 6. PoLicY resPonses
Late-industrialisation in SSA countries and China’s impact thereon need to be 
understood as multi-dimensional, path-dependent and path-shaping processes. 
Gauging macro-level China-related effects by estimating correlations could be 
a useful starting point to get a sense of the magnitude of different effects. How-
ever, not everything can be parametrised appropriately and merely establishing 
correlations and average effect sizes makes it impossible to trace the relevant 
transmission mechanisms on any given variable. This is particularly relevant 
when, as set out above, many of the China-related effects will work out differ-
ently depending on each country’s particular political economy, sets of policies 
as well as historical contingencies. Detailed country level case studies that com-
bine the results of micro/firm-level fieldwork research with broader macro-level 
analysis of systemic and political economy factors have the advantage of pro-
ducing this type of context-specific knowledge needed to trace the complexity 
of social systems. Yet, such studies face the problem of how to extrapolate from 
any specific case to other cases. This is relevant because the size and composi-
tion of China-related effects varies across countries.
Cluster analysis can provide a useful tool to bridge the two approaches. In 
practical terms, the aim of cluster analysis is to find groups of countries in the 
data that have a maximum degree of similarity within each group and significant 
differences across different groups. The purpose of the cluster is primarily to 
identify groups of countries with a similar set of China-related influences and 
thereby to help to situate case studies with respect to other cases. 
Grouping countries into groups with different sets of China-related 
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influences also allows us to assess whether there are any systematic differenc-
es across these groups of countries with similar China effects – for instance, 
whether the group of countries with predominantly positive China-effects fares 
systematically better than other groups. However, the purpose is not to explain 
the overall change in manufacturing output across countries. This change is de-
pendent on a range of non-China related effects and transmission mechanisms, 
including domestic policy, political economy and the overall growth potential 
of the country in question. As noted earlier, these factors are difficult to param-
eterise and causality is better explored in case studies. 
To facilitate further case study comparison within groups of countries with 
similar China-related influences, it is worth considering some country specific 
characteristics. For instance, the potential for domestic consumption-led indus-
trialisation depends on the size of the domestic market. This has policy implica-
tions. Larger, and already more wealthy, countries should have some advantage 
in promoting domestically oriented production with sufficient economies of 
scale. For countries that cannot rely on a large domestic market greater regional 
integration can be a way of increasing the size of the market. 
Countries have been grouped on China-related and country specific charac-
teristics as follows.11
The kmeans partition method is used on the three-year average (2009-2011) 
of the following variables, identified as being (potentially) correlated to changes 
in manufacturing output in the previous section. All countries are ranked either 
as low, medium and high on each of these four China-related variables: 
1.  Chinese Contracted Projects as share of GDP: to capture potential effects 
on the supply side (infrastructure development and linkage formation) and 
on the demand side (employment and income generation). 
2.  Exports to China as % of GDP: to capture possible effects of China’s eco-
nomic rise on the external demand constraint of SSA countries. 
3.  Consumer goods imports from China as share of GDP: to capture possi-
ble displacement effects on the domestic markets. 
4.  TOT - Terms of Trade (index of export prices over import prices): to 
capture the degree to which countries are affected (adversely or positively) 
by changes in relative price changes on world markets. 
In addition, countries have been classified according to their
5.  Manufacturing base: measured by SSA countries’ manufacturing output 
per head relative to world quintiles, i.e. countries in the lowest quintile are 
among the 20% least industrialised countries.
11  For a detailed description of variables and data sources see Appendix
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6.  Population size: to approximate the size of the domestic market, with the 
grouping reflecting the quintile in which the country is found when com-
pared to all countries globally, i.e. a “large” country is among the 20% larg-
est countries of the world, in terms of population. 
With some combinations not occurring, it becomes possible to identify five 
groups and four sub-groups of SSA countries with distinctly different potential 
China-effects: 
• Group A: Low impact group. In this group all direct economic flows be-
tween them and China are minor. At the same time, consumer goods imports 
from China also only make up for a small part of GDP. Group A1 combines 
countries negative or mildly positive terms of trade improvements, and A2 
countries which witnesses high increases in their terms of trade. In group A1, 
changes in manufacturing performance at the macro-level are least likely to 
be related to China’s direct or indirect influence. 
• Group B: Negative impact group. This group includes countries with low 
Chinese export demand, low Chinese project presence but contrary to the 
low impact group high shares of Chinese consumer goods imports relative 
to GDP. Countries in this group are more likely to suffer from displacement 
effects on their home markets while benefitting the least from interactions 
with China that could support domestic market formation. 
• Group C: Medium COP group. This group includes countries with low 
Chinese consumer goods imports and medium shares of COPs to GDP. Two 
sub-groups are formed depending whether they have low (C1) or medium 
Chinese export demand (C2)
• Group D. High COP, low export group. A fourth group includes all coun-
tries with low Chinese consumer goods imports, high shares of COP but low 
Chinese export demand. In groups C and D, we would expect moderately 
positive China-effects. 
• Group E. High impact group. Finally, group 5 ranks high in both Chinese 
export demand and Chinese projects but low in Chinese consumer goods 
imports relative to GDP. In this group we would expect the strongest positive 
China impact.
 We can now compare and analyse changes in manufacturing sector growth 
over the past decade (%-increase of manufacturing output per capita in 2011 
relative to a 1996-2000 average)12 for countries within these clusters13 and the 
group averages across clusters. 
12  to account for any outlier years at the beginning of the period
13  Detailed tables are presented in APPENDIX, pg. 26ff
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Table 2 presents the summary results of the across cluster analysis. It shows 
that, on average, the group of countries with high Chinese export market shares 
and strong Chinese contracted project presence have experienced the strongest 
growth in manufacturing output per capita (on average 129% relative to the 
1996-2000 average). They are followed by the group of countries with little 
exports to China, but many Chinese projects (on average manufacturing growth 
per capital of 53% over the past 10 years). These two groups perform better 
than both the low impact and medium COP group (with 23% and 26% average 
manufacturing output growth per capita respectively). This indicates that the 
share of COP to GDP is positively correlated to manufacturing sector growth. 
Within the low impact group, countries with strong improvements in their terms 
of trade (A2) perform significantly better than the other low impact countries, 
indicating that indirect China-effects linked to price effects on world markets 
matter. The group of countries which performs worst the group where Chinese 
consumer goods imports make up for a large share of GDP (merely 10% of 
manufacturing output growth on average). 







A Low impact group 22.66 11.79 -20.49 121.12
A1 Little effects and no/ low ToT improvement 11.47 9.06 -20.49 54.48
A2 Little effects and strong ToT improvement 63.69 80.51 -10.57 121.12
B Negative effect group 9.79 11.39 -5.32 21.68
C Medium COP 25.79 13.96 -53.57 145.23
C1 Medium projects and low exports 25.20 5.18 -53.57 145.23
C2 Medium projects and medium exports 28.76 24.83 -24 85.46
D High COP and low exports 53.14 40.25 -34.06 202.65
E High COP and high exports 129.07 153.27 -28.32 238.05
How these effects work out in practice and whether manufacturing sector growth 
can really be linked to these China-effects will have to be ascertained on a case 
by case basis. What is, worth noting is that we observe considerable variation 
within groups of countries with similar China effects (see appendix for detailed 
tables). For instance, in the medium impact group C, Lesotho, Mozambique 
and Tanzania perform considerably better than the other countries. In the high 
impact group E Angola is performing relatively better than Congo-Brazzaville 
despite very similar interaction with China and a similar initial degree of indus-
trialisation. The two countries, however, differ in their market size (see details 
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in APPENDIX group E). Within cluster groups comparative analysis can be 
used to ascertain whether this factor has played a significant role in explaining 
the divergence between the two countries and how policy has addressed the 
challenges associated to China-related effects. 
5. Conclusions
China impacts the prospects of industrial development through a multitude of 
channels. On the supply-side, Chinese firms (operating both through Chinese 
contracted projects and FDI) can promote knowledge and skill transfer. Chinese 
contracted projects can have a positive impact on the enabling environment for 
manufacturing sector development by improving upon basic infrastructure. Fi-
nally, Chinese capital goods are potentially more appropriate to serve domestic 
demand for bottom of the billion products. On the demand-side, increases in 
export demand and improvement of terms of trade can positively impact on a 
country’s balance of payments position. This effect may be outweighed by dis-
placement effects on world and domestic markets. Furthermore, Chinese con-
tracted projects can contribute to employment and income generation thereby 
broadening the demand base for consumer durables. Finally, Chinese contracted 
projects can also induce demand for the production of building materials. 
While Chinese engagement with African economies can, indeed, have posi-
tive impacts on industrialisation, these will largely depend on policy mediation. 
What constitutes ‘appropriate’ policy is itself dependent on our understanding 
of the workings of the economy and society. This paper has argued that domes-
tic market formation can be considered a core challenge of late-industrialisation 
which becomes all the more relevant in view of the changes in global demand 
and price structures linked to China’s systemic impact on the world economy. 
In particular, given China’s role in world markets, export-led industrialisation 
has to be complemented by domestic market formation. In this respect, build-
ing up intersectoral supply capacity (in particular linkage formation to the con-
struction, agricultural and mining sector), the strengthening of final consumer 
demand through labour market and redistributive policies, and the adaption of 
supply formation to new sources of domestic demand (bottom of the billion 
products) will be of particular importance.
Beyond the general conclusions reached on the role of domestic market for-
mation, the specific policy challenges facing individual SSA countries will vary 
depending on the precise nature of their interaction with China. This paper has 
identified groups of SSA countries with similar patterns of interaction with Chi-
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na to provide a starting point for further comparative analysis but also to test 
whether we do observe significant differences across groups with different pre-
dominant China-effects. Such across group variations are, indeed, observable, 
For instance, countries with high Chinese export demand and high Chinese pro-
ject presence have had, on average, the highest manufacturing output growth 
over the last decade. At the same time, countries with more or less similar and 
indeed very large China effects have experienced very different outcomes in 
terms of manufacturing sector development. For instance, within the group of 
countries benefitting from high Chinese export demand and a large volume of 
Chinese contracted projects, Angola performed much better than for example, 
Congo-Brazzaville. This points to the need for further research analysing coun-
try specific factors, in particular the political settlement and industrial policies 
in greater detail. 
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APPENDIX
Description of Key Variables:
1. Chinese Contracted Projects as share of GDP: 3 year average (2008-2010), 
data on COP is taken from the China Statistical Yearbook. For comparability, 
they were scaled by the recipient country’s GDP. 
On average, COPs account for 1.5% of GDP in the sample countries. Overall, 
there is an increasing trend in all sample countries, which reflects China’s in-
creasing engagement with SSA countries, but COPs remain nevertheless strong-
ly focussed on individual countries. In 2010, 8 countries (Chad, Niger, Equato-
rial Guinea, Botswana, Congo Brazzaville, Angola and Mauritania) had a COP 
to GDP ratio of more than 5%, while 12 countries have COP share of GDP of 
less than 1% in 2010. The highest COP share of GDP is 5.58%, while the lowest 
is only 0.008%.
2. Exports to China as % of GDP: 3 year average (2008-2010), data on exports 
to China is taken from the UN COMTRADE data base (BEC, SITC, revision 2). 
On average exports to China make up for 2.7% of GDP in the sample. The 
highest value is 25.5% in Congo-Brazzaville, the lowest value in average is 
0.00014% in Cape Verde.
3. Consumer goods imports from China as share of GDP: 3 year average 
(2008-2010), data on consumer goods imports from China is taken from the UN 
COMTRADE data base (BEC, SITC, revision 2).
On average, consumer goods imports from China make up for 3.51% of GDP 
in the sample. The highest sample value can be found in Togo, where consumer 
goods imports from China account for more 29.05% of GDP. The lowest sample 
value can be found in Swaziland, where they account for 0.09% of GDP.
4. TOT - Terms of Trade (index of export prices over import prices): 3 year 
average (2008-2010), data are extracted from the World Bank WDI database. 
The highest improvement in terms of trade can be found in Angola (155), the 
lowest average in Togo (34).
5. Degree of industrialisation: measured by SSA countries’ manufacturing out-
put per head relative to world quintiles, i.e. countries in the lowest quintile are 
among the 20% least industrialised countries. Calculations are based on UN 
National Accounts Main Aggregates Database.
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We find 27 SSA countries in the lowest quintile, 12 in the second lowest quin-
tile, three countries (Gabon, Botswana and Namibia) in third quintile, three 
countries (Mauritius, Seychelles and Swaziland) in the fourth quintile, none in 
the top quintile.
6. Country size: approximated by SSA countries’ population size, with the 
grouping reflecting the quintile in which the country is found when compared to 
all countries globally, i.e. a “large” country is among the 20% largest countries 
of the world, in terms of population. Data are based on UN National Accounts 
Main Aggregates Data Base. 
Detailed Cluster Tables
Using kmeans partition, 3 groups (low, medium and high) are calculated on all 
of the above variables. Based on this, countries are grouped into distinct impact 
groups as follows:




















Burundi 1 Medium 8,575,172 -7.3 0.6 0.08 0.52 138 1 1 1 1 A1
Sierra Leone 1 Medium 5,997,486 14.52 1.26 0.36 2.39 68.5 1 1 1 2 A1
Burkina Faso 1 medium- 
large
16,967,845 -20.49 0.02 1.17 0.22 102 1 1 1 1 A1
Malawi 1 medium- 
large
15,380,888 17.08 1.12 0.1 1.12 88.5 1 1 1 2 A1
Uganda 1 Large 34,509,205 54.48 0.98 0.13 1.37 107 1 1 1 1 A1
Cape Verde 2 very small 500,585 -0.41 0.69 0 1.67 101 1 1 1 1 A1
Sao Tome  
and Princ. 
2 very small 168,526 20.07 0.32 0.01 1.13 130 1 1 1 1 A1
Senegal 2 medium- 
large
12,767,556 4.77 1.26 0.25 1.78 97.6 1 1 1 1 A1
Cameroon 2 medium 
-large
20,030,362 9.06 0.45 1.9 1.33 137 1 1 1 1 A1
Namibia 3 Small 2,324,004 43.19 1.14 3.59 3.69 126 1 1 1 1 A1
Swaziland 4 Small 1,203,330 -8.82 0.06 0.31 0.09 107 1 1 1 1 A1
Nigeria 1 Large 162,500,000 80.51 1.09 0.41 1.44 186 1 1 1 3 A2
Côte d’Ivoire 2 medium- 
large
20,152,894 -10.57 0.12 0.35 1.14 150 1 1 1 3 A2
Gabon 3 Small 1,534,262 121.12 1 6.74 0.48 197 1 2 1 3 A2
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Gambia 1 Small 1,776,103 -5.32 0.27 0.86 8.07 97.4 1 1 2 1 B
Djibouti 1 Small 905,564 21.68 3.57 0.08 23.28 82.6 2 1 3 2 B
Benin 1 Medium 9,099,922 5.21 0.38 1.67 26.06 92.4 1 1 3 1 B
Togo 1 Medium 6,154,813 17.57 1.44 1.36 29.05 31.5 1 1 3 2 B




















Comoros 1 Small 753,943 -9.87 2.2 0 0.71 67.2 2 1 1 2 C1
Eritrea 1 Medium 5,415,280 -53.57 2.2 0.08 0.66 75.7 2 1 1 2 C1
Central Afr.
Republic
1 Medium 4,486,837 5.18 1.6 1.03 0.39 84 2 1 1 2 C1
Mali 1 medium- 
large
15,839,538 -22.2 3 0.63 0.94 137 2 1 1 1 C1
Zimbabwe 1 medium- 
large
12,754,378 -20.86 1.95 1.01 1.03 103 2 1 1 1 C1
Madagascar 1 medium- 
large
21,315,135 -6.91 1.82 0.81 2.75 74.5 2 1 1 2 C1
Guinea 1 medium- 
large
10,221,808 24.88 1.73 0.55 5.28 110 2 1 1 1 C1
Rwanda 1 medium- 
large
10,942,950 44.4 1.69 0.6 0.38 228 2 1 1 3 C1
Mozambique 1 medium- 
large
23,929,708 145.23 2.86 1.76 3.29 105 2 1 1 1 C1
Tanzania 1 Large 44,924,042 89.18 2.72 1.08 3.34 128 2 1 1 1 C1
Lesotho 2 Small 2,193,843 129.46 1.99 0.14 1.34 98.4 2 1 1 1 C1
Ghana 2 medium- 
large
24,965,816 29.21 1.87 0.33 4.62 167 2 1 1 3 C1
Kenya 2 Large 41,609,728 4.91 1.97 0.1 3.62 90 2 1 1 2 C1
Seychelles 4 very  
small
86,879 -3.8 4.33 0.13 0.95 72.9 2 1 1 2 C1
Mauritius 4 Small 1,306,593 22.74 1.51 0.08 2.15 76.8 2 1 1 2 C1
DR Congo 1 Large 67,757,577 -24 4.26 14.2 2.22 133 2 2 1 1 C2
Zambia 2 medium- 
large
13,474,959 24.83 2.28 9.61 0.34 173 2 2 1 3 C2
Sudan 2 Large 44,632,406 85.46 3.63 9.07 1.84 195 2 2 1 3 C2
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1 Small 1,547,061 -34.06 5.16 0.27 0.69 80.5 3 1 1 2 D
Liberia 1 Small 4,128,572 202.65 7.51 1.04 6.63 126 3 1 1 1 D
Niger 1 medium- 
large
16,068,994 -17.63 7.45 0 0.6 150 3 1 1 3 D
Chad 1 medium- 
large
11,525,496 33.53 8 2.31 0.27 180 3 1 1 3 D
Ethiopia 1 Large 84,734,262 87.39 4.62 0.7 0.89 119 3 1 1 1 D
Botswana 3 Small 2,030,738 46.96 6.3 0.76 1.96 82.2 3 1 1 2 D




















Mauritania 1 Small 3,541,540 -28.32 4.9 29.9 5.44 142 3 3 1 3 E
Equatorial 
Guinea
1 Small 720,213 210.48 10.96 10.0 0.62 207 2 3 1 3 E
Congo 2 Small 4,139,748 96.07 9.02 28.9 2.15 186 3 3 1 3 E
Angola 2 medium- 
large
19,618,432 238.05 5.55 24.5 1.53 211 3 3 1 3 E
